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INTRODUCTION

On June 5, 1981, the United States Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) published a report detailing five cases of a
rare lung infection in young, previously healthy, gay men living in
Los Angeles.' This marked the first official report of acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). 2 In the short time that follow·
ed, similar reports documented a rare form of cancer in gay men liv·
ing in New York City and California. 8 By year's end, reports showed
337 individuals with AIDS in the United States; 130 of those
individuals had died. 4 The end of the decade saw the number of
cases in the United States exceed one hundred thousand and the
number of AIDS-related deaths exceed fifty-nine thousand. 5
AIDS is caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), a
retrovirus that attacks CD4-positive T cells, causing a progressive
depletion of the immune system. 6 Mter attaching to the cell surface
and entering the cell, HIV integrates its genetic material into the
host genome through a process known as reverse transcription. 7
This integration into host DNA makes HIV impossible to eradicate
with current therapies."
1. CDC, Pneum.ocystis Pneumonia-Los Angeles, 30 MORBIDITY &MORTALITYWKLY.REP.
250, 250-51 (1981).
2. U.S DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., A Time line of HIV and AIDS, HlV.GOV, https:/1
www.hiv.gov/hiv-basics/overview/historylhiv-and-aids-timeline [https://perma.cc/TDQ4YQNE]. SeegeneraJly Fran~ise Barre-Sinoussi, Anna Laura Ross & Jean·Fran~is Delfraissy,
Past, Present and Future: 80 Years of HIV Research, 11 NATURE REvs. MICROBIOLOGY 877
(2013).
3. CDC,Kaposi 's SarcomaandPneum.ocystisPn.eumoniaAmong Homosexual Men-New
York City and California, 30 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 305, 305-07 (1981);
Lawrence K. Altman, Rare Cancer Seen in 41 Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1981, atA20,
https://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/03/us/rare-cancer-seen-in-41-homosexuals.html [https1/
perma.cc/6NTF-4TQ7].
4. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 2.
5. CDC, First 100,000 Cases of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United States,
38 MORBIDITY & MORTAIJTY WKLY. REP. 561, 561-63 (1989).
6. Steven G. Deeks, Julie Overbaugh, Andrew Phillips & Susan Buchbinder, HIV
Infection, 1 NATURE REVS. DISEASE PRIMERS 1, 4, 6 (2016).
7. I d. at 4, 9. For a lay description of the HlV life cycle, see The HIV Life Cycle, POZ
(July 28, 2020), https:l/www.poz.com/basicslhiv-basicslhiv-life-cycle [https:l/perma.cc/YKT5D3UB].
8. Deeks et al., supra note 6, at 4.

2022]

PATENT PROPHYLAXIS

2059

HIV remains a serious global health issue today. Since 1981, an
estimated seventy-nine million people have become infected with
HIV, and an estimated thirty-six million people have died from
AIDS-related illnesses.• In 2020, thirty-eight million people were
living with HIV globally, and 1.5 million people became newly infected with the virus. 10 In the United States alone, an estimated 1.2
million people are living with HIV/AIDS and, in 2019, an estimated
34,800 new HIV infections occurred. 11
Today, medicine treats HIV as a chronic illness. 12 However, given
the continued rate of new infections annually, there persists a critical need for effective methods to prevent the transmission and
spread of the virus. 13 Pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) is one such
method. 14
As its name suggests, PrEP is an HIV prevention medication that
HIV-negative individuals take before exposure to the virus to reduce
the risk of infection. 15 PrEP decreases the risk of HIV infection
across multiple at-risk populations, including gay and bisexual
men,'6 transgender women, 17 mixed-status couples (meaning only
one partner has HIV), 18 and people who inject drugs. 19 As of
publishing, there are currently three FDA-approved medications for
PrEP: pill-based Truvada and Descovy, as well as injectable
9. Global HIV & AIDS Statistics-Fact Sheet, UNAIDS, https://www.unaids.org/en/
resources/fact-sheet [https://perm.a.cc/R4X8-6HPY].
10. ld.
11. U.S. DEP'TOFHEALTH & HUM. SERVB., U.S. Statistics, HIV.GOV, https:l/www.hiv.gov/
hiv-basics/overview/data-and-trends/statistics [https:l/perma.cciLKE9-KBKZ].
12. See Steven G. Deeks, Shsron R. Lewin & Diane V. Havlir, The End of AIDS: HIV
Infection as a Chronic Disease, 382 LANCET 1626, 1626 (2013).

13. See Nelson L. Michael, Oral Preexposure Prophylaxis for HIV-Another Arrow in the
Quiver?, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2663, 2663 (2010).
14. See id.
15. PrEP Facts: Introduction & FAQ, S.F. AIDS FOUND., https:l/www.sfaf.org/resourcelibrary/prep-facts-introduction-faq [https://perma.cc/MHM3-X8J3].
16. See Robert M. Grant eta!., Preexposure Chemoprophylaxis for HIV Prevention in Men
Who Have Sex with Men, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2587, 2597 (2010).
17. ld.
18. Jared M. Baeten et al., Antiretroviral Prophylaxis for HIV Prevention in Heterosexual
Men and Women, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 399, 400, 407 (2012); Michael C. Thigpen et al.,
Antiretroviral Preexposure Prophylaxis for Heterosexual HIVTrcmsmission in Botswana, 367
NEW ENG. J. MED. 423, 424, 432 (2012).
19. Ka.chit Choopanya et al., AntiretroviralProphylaxis for HIVlnfection in Injecting Drug
Users in Bangkok, Thailand (The Bangkok Tenofovir Study): A Randomised, Double-Blind,
Placebo-Controlled Phase 3 Trial, 381 LANCET 2083, 2088 (2013).

2060

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2057

Apretude. 20 Both Truvada and Descovy utilize fixed-dose combinations of the same two drugs--emtricitabine21 and tenofovir22manufactured and sold by the same company: Gilead Sciences. 23
Truvada is highly effective at preventing new HIV infections-up to
99 percent effective in individuals who take the medication daily."4
Despite this proven efficacy, PrEP remains underutilized by and
inaccessible to the most at-risk populations. CDC estimates show
that 1.1 million people in the United States would benefit from access to PrEP, but since 2012 only 10 percent of adults with PrEP
indications•• have started taking the drug.'" Of those who take the
20. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., Pre· Exposure Prophylaxis, HN.GOV, https:/1
www.hiv.gov/hiv-basicslhiv-preventionlusing-hiv-medication-to-reduce-risk/pre-exposureprophylaxis [https://perma.cc/U64B-YS6B]. Apretude is the first PrEP medication that does
not involve a daily pill. Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves First Injectable
Treatment for HN Pre-Exposure Prevention (Dec. 20, 2021), https:l/www.fda.gov/newsevents/press-announcements/fda-approves-first-injectable-treatment-hiv-pre-exposureprevention [https://perma.cc/7T7X-4CCD]. Apretude was approved by the FDA on December
20, 2021.Id. This Note focuses only on the pill-based forms of PrEP: Truvada and Descovy.
21. Emtricitabine is abbreviated Fl'C in medical literature and sold under the brand
name Emtri.va. See NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH, Nucleoside and Nucleotide Analogue Reverse
Transcriptase Inhibitor~Emtricitabine (Dec. 29, 2020), https://clinicalinfo.hiv.gov/en/guide
lines/perinatal/emtri.citabine-emtriva-ftc [https://perma.ccJVIAL-UXHG]. This Note will refer
to the drug as "emtricitabine.''
22. Tenofovir has two distinct prodrug formulations that are metabolized into active
tenofovir in the body. In Truvada, tenofovir consists oftenofovir disoproxil fumarate (TDF).
See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 20. In Descovy, tenofovir consists of
tenofovir alafenamide (TAF). Id. This Note will refer to both drugs as ~nofovir" or by their
specific formulations. In the medical literature, Truvada is sometimes referred to as FTCtrDF
while Descovy is sometimes called FTCrrAF. See NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH, supra note 21. This
Note will refer to both drugs individually using their brand names or collectively as "PrEP.''
23. See generally Maggie L. Shaw, In Debate over PrEP, Researchers Raise Questions
About Benefit vs Value, AM.J. MANAGED CARE (Jao. 13, 2020), https1/www.ajmc.com/view/iodebate-over-prep-researehers-raise-questi.ons-about-benefit-vs-value- [https://perma.cc/KZ99JBVY].
24. Peter L. Anderson et al., Emtricitabine-Tenofovir Concentrations and Pre-Exposure
Prophylaxis Efficacy in Men Who Have Sex with Men, 4 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 1, 4-5
(2012).
25. PrEP is indicated for HIV-negative people who have condomless anal or vaginal sex,
have shared injection or drug preparation equipment in the last six months, and/or had a bacterial STI in the last six months. CDC, Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) Care System (Nov.
18, 2021), https:J/www.cdc.gov/hiv/effective-interventions/preventiprepl [https://perma.cd

U9GP-WNND].

26. Robert Goldstein, PrEP Prevents HIV-So Why Aren~More People Taking It?, HARv.
HEALTH BLOG (Oct. 4, 2019, 6:30AM), https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/prep·preventshiv-so-why-arent-more-people-taking-it-2019100417942 [https://perm.a.cc/7ER4-RKL5]. See
generally Dawn K. Smith, Michelle Van Handel & Jeremy Grey, Estimates of Adults with
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drug, the majority are white men who live in either the Northeast
or West Coast and have sex with men. 27 Researchers and activists
have pointed to one obvious cause for these large disparities in
PrEP use across race, geographic region, and sex: the cost. 28
Truvada for PrEP costs in excess of $1,900 a month in the United
States. 29 Accordingly, the cost of preventing HIV infection for at·risk
individuals is greater than sixty dollars a pill-sixty dollars a day. 80
Insurance should cover this cost, but the reality is more complicat·
ed." 1 The cost ofDescovy, Gilead's new PrEP medication, is similarly
high. 82 This exorbitant price stands in stark contrast to the generic
version ofTruvada sold internationally for six dollars a month-less
than a quarter a day."3
These price discrepancies and subsequent calls from activists
sparked a flurry of political and legal attention for PrEP access.
Partially in response to this pressure, and as part of the former
Trump administration's plan to end the HIV epidemic, 84 the
Indications for HN Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis by Jurisdiction, Transmission Risk Group, and
Il=e/Ethnicity, United States, 2015, 28 ANNALS EPIDEMIOLOGY 850 (2018).

27. Goldstein, supra note 26.
28. Trenton Straube, Here's How We Can Get Universal Access to PrEP, POZ (July 25,
2018), https://www.poz.com/article/universal-access-prep-hiv-prevention [https:l/perma.cc/
BN2C-LW5R].
29. Truva<kJ.Prices, Coupons, and Patient .Assistance Programs, DRUGS.COM, https://www.
drugs.com/price-guide/truvada [https1/perma.ce/PK66-2STM).
30. ld.
31. Federal guidelines only recently required health insurance companies to cover the cost
of PrEP, related doctor's visits, and lab tests. Scott Saloway & Ryan Benk., The Federal Government Is Making HIV Preuention Treatment Free- But There's a Catch, NPR (July 29,
2021, 12:32 PM), https1/www.npr.org/202ll07/29/1022255279/feds·are·making·hiv-prevention·
treatment-free [https://perma.cc/3GXY-BHCY]. However, reduction in patient cost has not
been observed since this policy change. See Sarah Varney, HIV Preventive Care Is Supposed
to Be Free in the US. So, Why Are Some Patients Still Paying?, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar.
3, 2022), https:llkhn.org/newslarticle/prep-hiv-prevention-costs-covered-problems-insurance/
[https://perma.cc/NFS6·FBUE].
32. Descouy Prices. Coupons, and Patient Assistance Programs, DRUGS. COM, https://www.
drugs.com/price-guide/descovy [https://perma.cc/7KNP-ZCHR].
33. PREP4ALL, A NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR UNIVERSAL ACCESS TO HIV PRE-ExPoSURE
PRoPHYLAXIS (PREP) IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2018), https1/www.poz.com/pdfs/nationalaction-plan-prep-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y677-KVVN].
34. See Anthony S. Fauci, Robert R. Redfield, George Sigounas, Michael D. Weahkee &
Brett P. Giroir, Ending the HIV Epidemic: A Plan for the United States, 321 JAMA 844, 844
(2019); see also Robert Pear & Katie Rogers, Trump Expected to Announce Plan to Stop Spread
of H.l. V. in the U.S. by 2030, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2DT4tzA [https1/
perma.cc/K9H5-A8C8].
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administration initiated a rare patent infringement lawsuit against
Gilead in November 2019. 35 In the suit, the government alleges that
Gilead infringed on patents issued to the United States Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) and CDc.•• According to court
documents, Gilead has refused HHS's attempts to license these patents and collect royalties for years. 37
This approach greatly differs from Democratic lawmakers and
PrEP activists' proposals to reduce the cost of PrEP and expand access to the drug. PrEP4All, one such activist group, has specifically
called for the government to utilize march-in rights under section
203 of the Bayh-Dole Act or the paid-up license under section 202. 38
However, march-in rights have never been exercised in the forty
years since the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act.••
This Note argues that both approaches are wrong. Instead of utilizing patent infringement litigation to recover damages from Gilead
or invoking a never-utilized provision of the Bayh-Dole Act to grant
a manufacturing license, this Note argues that 28 U.S.C. § 1498,
also known as "use without license," is the appropriate government
action to rapidly expand access to PrEP and reduce costs to the individual patient.
Part I of this Note details the discovery ofTruvada for PrEP and
the ongoing patent infringement litigation brought by HHS, discusses the patents currently held by CDC and Gilead, and examines
the shortcomings of infringement litigation as a means to expand
access to the drug. Part II analyzes the mechanism of march-in
rights under the Bayh-Dole Act and discusses two previously
attempted applications for the HIV-management drug ritonavir to
demonstrate why march-in rights will always fail to expand access
to life-saving medications or reduce costs to consumers. Part III
discusses the unique legal right conferred to the government under
§ 1498 and demonstrates why§ 1498 is the correct course of action
to expand access to PrEP. PrEP is a life-saving and life-altering
35. Daniel Vector, Trump Administration Sues Gilead. Maker of H.I. V.-PreventionDrugs,
N.Y. TiMES (Nov. 7, 2019), https:llnyti.ms/2JX946E [https:llperms.cciGB53-VRK2].
36. ld.
37. ld.
38. 35 U.S.C. §§ 202(c)(4), 203; PREP4ALL, supra note 33, at 36.
39. JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44597, MARCH-IN RIGHTS UNDER THE BAYSDOLE ACT 8 (2016).
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medication. Patient access is an issue to address proactively-and
prophylactically-through established intellectual property regimes.
I. PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION IS UNLIKELY TO EXPAND
PATIENT ACCESS TO PREP

In November 2019, the United States initiated a lawsuit against
Gilead Sciences and its parent company Gilead Sciences Ireland for
patent infringement concerning four patents for PrEP. 40 The government's complaint details a long history of drug development at
CDC and repeatedly alleges that "Gilead's only contribution to
CDC's patented research was providing samples of the drugs that
CDC used for testing purposes." 41 The government alleges four
counts of willful infringement of its patents.'2 In response, Gilead
denies all infringement claims and raises several affirmative
defenses and counterclaims.'" As of publishing, the parties are
completing discovery. 44 The trial is not set to occur until 2023.'5
A. The Development of Truvada for PrEP

The government argues that years of experimentation at CDC,
including the creation and development of novel animal modeling
techniques for HIV transmission, are prerequisite to the discovery
of emtricitabine and tenofovir for PrEP. 46 Results published by CDC
in 2008 showed the first evidence that PrEP could effectively

40. See Vector, supra note 35.
41. Complaint at 1-3, United States v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 1:19-CV-02103 (D. Del. Nov.

6, 2019) [hereinafter Complaint].
42. Id. at 68-75.
43. Defs.' 3d Am. Aoswer & Affirmative Defenses & Def. Gilead Scis., Inc.'s 2d Am.
Countercls. at 66-109, United States v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 1:19-CV-02103 (Apr. 21, 2021)

[hereinafter Answer]. Gilead's affirmative defenses included nonin:fringement, invalidity,
unclean hands, inequitable conduct, derivation, safe harbor, acquiescence, implied waiver, no
willfulness, no exceptional case, no recovery of costs, failure to mitigate, no standing, and no
constitutional authority. Id. at 66-91. Gilead also brought eight counterclaims: four counterclaims for noninfringement and four for invalidity for each patent-in-suit. ld. at 104-09.
44. Scheduling Order at 4, United States v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 1:19-CV-02103 (D. Del.

June 25, 2020) [hereinafter Scheduling Order].
45. Id. at 13.
46. Complaint, supra note 41, at 24-27.
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prevent the transmission of HIV in humans. 47 The study showed
that in all test primates that received emtricitabine and tenofovir,
either daily or immediately before exposure to SIV, 48 PrEP protected
them from infection. 49 The five CDC scientists listed on the patentsin-suit authored this study. 50 In one published report, CDC researchers concluded that the high efficacy of this drug combination
supported similar PrEP trials in humans; other researchers completed the first such trial two years later."'
The Preexposure Prophylaxis Initiative (iPrEx) study randomly
assigned 2,500 HIV-negative men or transgender women who have
sex with men to receive the emtricitabine/tenofovir combination or
a placebo."2 Following the study's observation period, participants
in the experimental group experienced a 44 percent reduction in the
incidence ofHIV infection. 53 Participants in the experimental group
who adhered to the daily dose experienced a relative reduction in
HIV-infection risk of 92 percent. 54 Based on this groundbreaking
study and other subsequent trials, the FDA approved the use of
emtricitabine/tenofovir as PrEP in 2012."5

B. CDC's Patents-in-Suit
Based off of this research, CDC obtained four patents: U.S. Patent
Nos. 9,044,509 ('509), 9,579,333 (333), 9,937,191 (191), and
10,335,423 ( 423). All four patents share the title "Inhibition ofHIV
47. J. Gerardo Garcia-Lerma et al., Prevention of Rectal SHIV Transmission in Macaques
by Daily or Intermittent Prophylaxis with Emtricitabine and Tenofovir, 6 PLoSMED. 291, 291

(2008).

48. SN, or the simian immunodefiCiency virus, "is a well-established.modelfor liTV transmission" in macaques. Id. at 292.
49. Id. at 291.
50. ld.; see infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
51. Garda-Lerma et al., supra note 47, at 298; Grant et al., supra note 16, at 2587.
52. Grant et al., supra note 16, at 2587.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2597. In a subsequent analysis of the iPrEx trial, two doses of emtricitabine/tenofovir a week resulted in a 76 percent reduction in HIV risk; four doses a week
resulted in a 96 percent reduction; and daily doses resulted in a 99 percent reduction.
Anderson et al., supra note 24, at 1.
55. FDA Approves Truvada for Reducing the Risk of Sexually Acquired HN Infection,
DRUGS.COM (July 16, 2012), https1/www.drugs.comlnewdrugslfda-approves-truvada-reducingrisk-sexually-acquired-hiv-infection-3383.html [https1/perma.cc/SJ5L-CZPR].
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Infection Through Chemoprophylaxis";66 list CDC scientists Walid
Heneine, Thomas M. Folks, Robert Janssen, Ronald A. Otten, and
Jose Gerardo Garcia Lerma as their inventors; and list the United
States as assignee, via the Secretary of HHS. 67 The government
alleges Gilead infringed these four patents. 58
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process" 69 may
obtain a patent so long as that patent meets the conditions of novelty,60 nonobviousness, 61 and delineated written specification requirements. 62
Although each of the four patents has different claim language,
they all generally describe methods for PrEP use in humans or
primates for some combination of emtricitabine, tenofovir, or a tenofovir prodrug. The '333, '191, and '423 patents all expire in 2027; the
'509 patent expires in 2031. 63 The '509 patent was the first filed and
all subsequent patents are continuations of that application. 64 The
claims between the four patents vary slightly, but the '509 patent is
exemplary.
The '509 patent describes and claims "[a] process of protecting a
primate host from a self-replicating infection by an immunodeficiency retrovirus [HIV]" by selecting a host not infected with the
virus and administering a "pharmaceutically effective amount" of
both emtricitabine and tenofovir "prior to an exposure" and "administered orally."65 The '509 patent also describes and claims a
similar process in humans instead of all primates. 66
The '333 patent claims a similar process wherein the effective
amounts of emtricitabine and tenofovir are "administered orally,
56. The '333 Patent is errantly called "'nhibition of HIV Infection Through Chemoprophyal.xi.s [sic]."
57. U.S. Patent No. 9,044,509, at [54], [75], [73] (filed Jan. 31, 2007) (issuedJune2, 2015);
U.S. Patent No. 9,579,333, at [54], [72], [73] (filed Apr. 6, 2015) (issued Feb. 28, 2017); U.S.
Patent No. 9,937,191, at [54], [72], [73] (filedJan.13, 2017) (issuedApr.10, 2018); U.S. Patent
No. 10,335,423, at [54], [72], [73] (filed Mar. 6, 2018) (issued July 2, 2019).
58. Complaint, supra note 41, at 51-57.
59. 35 u.s.c. § 101.
60. Id. § 102.
61. Id. § 103.
62. Id. § 112.
63. Complaint, supra note 41, at 53, 56.
64. See, e.g., '191 Patent col. 111. 7-13.
65. '509 Patent col. 1211. 35-53.
66. Id. at col. 1311. 17-25, col. 1411. 1-5.
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subcutaneously or vaginally" in either humans or primates, as
opposed to just orally. 67 The patent claims use of either tenofovir
generally or its TDF prodrug formulation. 68
The '191 patent claims the process of administering the same
agents in a ''tablet" formulation and refers to HIV as "the human
immunodeficiency retrovirus." 69 The patent also claims use of either
tenofovir or its TDF prodrug formulation. 70
In turn, the '423 patent claims the process of administering the
combination of emtricitabine and tenofovir or any "tenofovir prodrug."" If the court finds the '423 patent valid and enforceable
against Gilead, the government may allege Descovy for PrEP, which
utilizes the TAF prodrug formulation oftenofovir, is as equally infringing as Truvada. This could stymie Gilead's current marketing
attempts to switch Truvada patients over to Descovy.'2

C. Gilead's Underlying Patents
The four patents-in-suit are not the only patents to consider in
this analysis. Gilead owns and owned several patents surrounding
the two component drugs ofTruvada and Descovy. Gilead's patents
to the TDF formulation oftenofovir expired prior to the start ofthis
litigation, but Gilead's exclusive patents to emtricitabine did not
expire until September 2021. 73 These patents prevented generic
versions of PrEP from entering the market until they expired-with
one exception. In May 2019, Gilead announced that it would allow
67. '333 Patent col. 1211. 48-67, col. 1311. 31-33, col. 1411. 1-16.
68. ld. at col. 1211. 59-60, col. 1411. 9-10.
69. '191 Patent col. 1211. 32-47, col. 1311. 13-27, col. 1411. 1-2.
70. Id. at col. 1211. 41-42, col. 1311. 23-24.
71. '423 Patent col. 1211. 64-67, col. 1311. 1-13, col. 1411. 1-16.
72. See, e.g., Angus Liu, Gilead's Converting Truvada PrEP Users to Descovy Faster than
Expected: Analyst, FIERCE PHARMA (Dec. 3, 2019, 12:13 PM), https1/www.fiercepharma.com/
marketing/gilead-s-converting-truvada-prep-users-to-descovy-faster-than-expected-analyst
[https://perrna.cc/DWT8-H5L2].
73. Answer, supra note 43, at 45. U.S. Patent No. 6,642,245 (filed June 7, 1995) (issued
Nov. 4, 2003) expired in May 2021 after a pediatric exclusivity period extension. U.S. Patent
No. 6,703,396 (filed Mar. 13, 1995) (issued Mar. 9, 2004) expired in September 2021. Gilead
also has four patents for alternative pharmaceutical formulations of Truvada which do not
expire until2024, but none of these patents should bar a generic of Truvada from coming to
market. See, e.g., U .8. Patent No. 8,592,397 (filed on Aug. 20, 2008) (issued on Nov. 26, 2013);
U.S. Patent No. 9,744,181 (filed on Oct. 24, 2014) (issued on Aug. 29, 2017).
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one of its competitors, Teva Pharmaceuticals, to market a generic
version of Truvada starting in late 2020. 74 This decision to allow a
limited license was met with much skepticism among PrEP activists
out of fear that it "will do little to reduce price in a way that will
increase access" to PrEP. 75 This fear ultimately proved correct. 76
Meanwhile, some of Gilead's patents for the TAF formulation of
tenofovir used in Descovy are not set to expire until2032. 77 Activists
and patients argue that these patents should be subject to stricter
scrutiny and allege Gilead purposefully delayed the development of
the TAF formulation of tenofovir and Descovy by five years in order
to gain a monopoly on PrEP drugs for a longer period oftime. 78 The
veracity of these allegations is beyond the scope of this Note and
would be nothing more than inappropriate conjecture. But the end
result remains the same-PrEP remains inaccessible due to the
high cost resulting from this existing monopoly.

D. The Shortcomings of Patent Infringement Litigation to
Expand Drug Access
The government's attempt to lower drug prices and expand access
to PrEP through patent infringement litigation is effectively a
sledgehammer: unwieldy, unyielding, and unlikely to fix an issue
74. Tim Fitzsimons, Generic HN Prevention Drug Coming in 2020, Gilead Says, NBC
NEWS (May 8, 2019, 1:23PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/generic-hiv-preven

tion-drug-ooming-2020-gilead-says-n1003391 [https://perma.cc/4X6R-NK3Y].
76. Mathew Rodriguez, Gilead Will Allow Generic Truuc.<k!. to Hit US Market Next Year,
OUT (May 8, 2019, 1:24PM), https1/www.out.oomlhealth/2019/6/08/gilead-will-allow-generictruvada-hit-us-market-next-year [https://perma.cc/J3LP-DNE8].
76. Teva's generic version of Truvada has a list price of $1,455 per month, or roughly
forty-nine dollars per pill. Liz Hi.ghleyman, First Generic Truvada Now Available in the
United States, POZ (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.poz.com/articlelfirst-generic-truvada-nowavailable-united-states [https://perma.cc/J4T4-ECU3].
77. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No.8, 764,066 (flied on Aug. 16, 2012) (issued on June 17, 2014).
78. Christopher Rowland, Gilead Delayed Safer HIV Drug to &tend Monopoly Profits,
Advocates Allege, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/eco

nomy/gilead-delayed-safer-hiv-drug-to-extend-monopoly-profi.ts-advocates-allege/2019/12/

05/71d4d6ae-1538-11ea-8406-df3c54b3253e_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q8MM-ELTI']; see
also Trudy Ring, PrEP4All Claims Gilead Held Back Safer HIV Drug, ADVOCATE (Dec. 6,
2019, 8:17 PM), https1/www.advocate.oomlhealth/2019/12/06/prep4all-claims-gilead-heldback-safer-hiv-drug [https://perma.cc/P768-5YDG] ("Gilead has not only intentionally delayed
clinical development of a drug to artificially manipulate its eligibility for a patent-term extension, but it has done so despite the apparent harm to patients.").
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that requires a more delicate approach. To boot, the ultimate goal
of infringement litigation remains unclear.
Analyzing the merits of the case would be little more than guesswork in this Note, but at least one patent law expert has speculated
that CDC's patents are both valid and enforceable. 79 Mter analyzing
the patent requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, and specification discussed above, the expert addressed Gilead's potential
infringement:
[I]t appears that use of [Truvada for PrEP] tablets as instructed
by the [Truvada for PrEP] prescribing information meets each
and every limitation of claim 1 of the '509 patent. Therefore, if
claim 1 of the '509 patent ... [is] found to be valid and enforceable, ... [there is] no reason to believe that a court would not find
that use of [Truvada for PrEP] tablets ... directly infringes that
claim. 80
However, despite this potential for success on the merits, pursuit
of patent infringement litigation remains an ineffective way to reduce costs to consumers and expand access to the drug.
In its prayer for relief, the government sought a finding of infringement, enhanced damages for willful infringement, 81 and
royalties for continued infringement, as well as costs, attorneys'
fees, and any additional relief deemed appropriate by the court. 82
What those damages may be is a difficult endeavor to calculate.
Courts may award "damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty." 83
Generally, courts have interpreted this provision to award two
categories of damages: the reasonable royalties explicitly mentioned
or lost profits. 84 Courts require plaintiffs to satisfy a high burden of
79. Letter from Christopher Morten, YaleL. Sch., to Glob. Health Just. P'ship &PrEP4All
Collaboration (Mar. 12, 2019), https:/llaw.yale.edulsites/default/fileslarea/center/ghjp/docu
mentslghjpmortenstatement.pdf [https://perma.cc/AMS3-M7CT].
80. Id. at 9.

81. 35 U .S.C. § 284 ("['I'] he court may increase the damages up to three times the amount
found or assessed.").

82. Complaint, supra note 41, at 76.
83. 35 u.s.c. § 284.
84. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655 (2009).
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proof to recover lost profits, the least of which is actually bringing
the product to market. 85 Neither HHS, CDC, nor any branch of the
United States government ever sought to bring an emtricitabine/
tenofovir combination to market for PrEP. As such, lost profits are
an unlikely damage award.
Reasonable royalties, meanwhile, serve as a ''backstop" for plaintiffs who cannot prove lost profits as the result of infringement. 86 In
fact, "[r]easonable royalty law is designed with the nonmanufacturing patentee in mind."87 Rationally, an infringed patent has
some value, especially to the infringer. As such, violators should pay
some licensing fee to utilize that patent, even in an underserved
market. 88
The question then becomes: What is a reasonable royalty for use
of CDC's patents? Truvada earned Gilead $3 billion in sales in
2018. 89 According to Gilead's annual reports, the drug has earned
the company $36 billion since 2004. 90 While it is unclear what portion of those sales is attributable to CDC's patents,"' at least one
industry estimate found the government could claim $1 billion in
royalties, or up to $3 billion if the court finds willful infringement. 92
While both of these assessments are much higher than the average
award in a patent infringement case,"3 neither is unheard of for
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 656-67.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 661.
See id. at 655-56.

Christopher Rowland, An HN Treatment Cost Taxpayers Millions. The Gouemment
Patented It. But a Pharma Giant Is Making Billions., WASH. PosT (Mar. 26, 2019), https:/1

www.washingtonpost.com/businessleconomy/pharma-giant-pro:fits-from-hiv-treatment-fundedby-taxpayers-and-patented-by-the-government/2019/03/26/cee5afb4-40fc-lle9-9361-301ffb
5bd5e6_story.html [https://perma.cc/U6UZ-S4GB].
90. Id.
91. The government estimates that 60 percent of Truvada sales were for Truvada for
PrEP and that Gilead has received approximately $6.7 billion in revenue since the '509 patent
was issued. Complaint, supra note 41, at 61.
92. Donald G. McNeil Jr. &Apoorva Mandavilli, Who Owns H.l. V.-PreuentionDrugs? The
Taxpayers, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2019), https:/lwww.nytimes.com/2019/11/08/healthl
hiv-prevention-truvada-patents.html [https:l/perma.cc/6QDH-U7HF].
93. The median damage award for patent infringement litigation was $10.2 million in
2017 and varied highly by industry. LANnAN ANSELL, RoNEN ARAD, DoUG BRANCH, HYEYUN
LEE,ADILPASHA&PAULROBINSON, 2018PATENTLITIGATIONSTUDY 5, 12 (2018), https://www.
ipwatchdog.com/wp-contentluploads/2018/09/2018-pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf [https:/1
perma.cc/97TW-LWVV].
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Gilead. 94 A court's attempt to answer this question, however, would
require expert testimony, speculation, guesswork, and an attorney's
attempt at math. 95 This uncertainty in the amount of damages
available to the government is just one of the infringement litigation
strategy's shortcomings.
Assuming that the goal of this litigation is to reduce the price of
and expand access to PrEP, 96 it remains unclear how damages
awarded to HHS will benefit patients. PrEP activists have called for
the government to use any damages awarded to help uninsured
Americans gain access to the drug, but whether the government will
meet these demands is another unknown. 97
The list of indeterminate factors does not end there. Assuming
the government prevails in this suit, it is unclear whether access to
PrEP will actually change. The government may take a finding of
validity and license the PrEP patents to other manufacturers in an
attempt to increase competition and drive down the cost. Notably,
this step to expand PrEP access does not require preemptive victory
in the ongoing patent infringement suit, raising further questions
as to government priorities.•• Assuming instead that Gilead prevails on its counterclaims of nonvalidity or noninfringement, what
comes next? Gilead's near-monopoly on Truvada continues, Teva's
generic version of the drug remains equally expensive, and patients
are left in the lurch. All of which assumes the litigation ever meets
a final valid judgment on the merits. 99 The current trial date is not
until 2023. 100 A plethora of factors may change before that date,
94. See ldenix Pharms. LLC v. Gilead Scis. Icc., 941 F.3d 1149, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(affirming a judgment as a matter of law and reversing a jury's verdict of$2.54 billion against
Gilead).
95. See Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 788 (7th Cir. 2013) C'Innumerable are the lawyers who explain that they picked law over a technical field because they have a 'math

block."').

96. The government stated this goal as part of the former Trump administration's plan
to eradicate new cases of HN/AIDS by 2030. See Fauci et al., supra note 34, at 844-45.
97. McNeil & Mandavilli, supra note 92.
98. See infra Parts Il·ill.
99. It is axiomatic of litigation that more than 96 percent of cases settle. E.g., Marc
Gslanter & Mis Cahill, ':Mast Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion andRegulatianof Settlements,
46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339·40 (1994).
100. Scheduling Order, supra note 44. Further, the average patent infringement case takes
2.4 years to go to trial. ANSELL ET AL., supra note 93, at 14.
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including continued court delays from the COVID-19 pandemic101
and the strong likelihood of appeal. 102
In the meantime, patients' lives remain unchanged. The government's current path via litigation offers no short-term benefits to
patients without access to PrEP. The nature of litigation and appeals makes any long-term benefits unpredictable. Further, the
government's path forward if it loses is unclear. With these drawbacks, the ongoing infringement litigation is unlikely to achieve its
purported goal to expand access to PrEP.
II. A FIRST TIME FOR EVERYTHING: THE BAYH-DOLEACT

PrEP activists, as well as some politicians, have called for the
government to utilize one of two provisions in the Bayh-Dole Act to
expand access to PrEP: "march-in rights" or a "paid-up license."103
For reasons discussed in this Part, neither of these options is the
appropriate method for proactively expanding patient access to
PrEP as both come with major drawbacks.
A. How March-In Authority Works in Theory

The Bayh-Dole Act provides, in part, that for "any subject
invention" acquired with the grant support of a federal agency, that
agency "shall have the right ... to grant a nonexclusive, partially
exclusive, or exclusive license" to any responsible applicant upon
reasonable terms. 104 In other words, if government funding supports
research that culminates in a patent, the government has a right to
create a license to that patented invention, so long as it pays a
101. See, e.g., Chelsea Donovan, Legal Limbo: How Attorneys Are Dealing with Backlog of
Cases Due to COVID-19, WTKR (June 4, 2020, 8:18AM), https://www.wtkr.com/legal-limbo-

how-attorneys-are-dealing-with-backlog-of-cases-due-to-covid-19

[https://perm.a.cc/7AV6-

XWSD].
102. Seventy-eight percent of patent infringement litigation is appealed in some capacity.
ANSELL ET AL., supra note 93, at 15.
103. PaEP4ALL, supra note 33, at 36-39; Peter Sullivan, 2020 Democrats Embrace
Aggressive Step on Drug Prices, HILL (Oct. 9, 2019, 6:04AM), https://thehill.com/policy/
healthcare/464948-2020-democrats-embrace-aggressive-step-on-drug-pri.ces [https://perma.
cc/CV7V-8PKJ].
104. 35 U.S.C. § 203(a).
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reasonable royalty. 105 Interested third parties can petition the
government to exercise this right on their behalf. 106 Should the
patent holder refuse such a request, the federal agency can authorize the license itself so long as the application meets one of four
conditions. 107 One, the patent holder has not taken effective steps,
"within a reasonable [amount of] time," to "achieve [a] practical
application" of the invention. 108 Two, such a license is "necessary to
alleviate health or safety needs" not currently met by the patent
holder. 109 Three, such action is necessary to meet a specified federal
regulation not currently satisfied. 110 Orfour, breach of an agreement
under § 204 of the Act requires that the patented invention be
manufactured substantially in the United States. 111
The Act further provides that "any contractor, inventor, assignee,
or exclusive licensee adversely affected" by this section may appeal
a march-in rights petition in the United States Court of Federal
Claims. 112 By design, the statute permits the patentee to challenge
the government's grant of a license to a potential competitor or
other third party. 113 Further, for any case granted under options (1)
or (3) above, "the agency's determination shall be held in abeyance
pending the exhaustion of appeals or petitions." 114 When the government grants a march-in license due to a failure to take effective
steps or out of necessity to meet a federal regulation, the license will
not take effect until the patentee has had their day in court. 115
The use of march-in authority under the Act does not invalidate
or void the patent anyway; instead, the march-in right grants an
effective license to an enterprise chosen by the government or to the
government itself. 116 Notably, the patent holder retains the ability
to enforce the patent and bring infringement actions against any
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See id.
See ul.
ld.
ld. § 203(a)(1).
ld. § 203(a)(2).
ld. § 203(a)(3).
ld. § 203(a)(4).
ld. § 203(b).
See id.
ld.
See id.
See THOMAS, supra note 39, at 7-8.
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other entity not granted rights under the government's march-in
authority, while receiving reasonable compensation for governmentsanctioned use under the Act. 117 March-in rights are distinct from
the "nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license"
granted to the United States government under § 202(c)(4) of the
Act and as discussed in Part II.D below. 118
At the time of its passage, the Bayh-Dole Act marked a major
departure from the federal government's prior "practice of retaining
title to nearly all the inventions it funded." 119 The Act was designed
to incentivize new research by granting titles to inventions created
under federal grants. 120 Some scholars have argued that the Act was
meant as a "powerful price-control" mechanism, mandating that
"inventions resulting from federally funded research ... be sold at
reasonable prices."121 However, the Act has never been used in this
capacity. 122
The Act defines the "practical application" necessary to prevent
march-in rights authorization under§ 203(a)(l) to mean the "manufacture ... under such conditions as to establish that the invention
is being utilized and that its benefits are ... available to the public
on reasonable terms." 123 For example, a patent holder wishing to
avoid government march-in under this mechanism would need to
bring the patented invention to market to some "reasonable" degree
and at a "reasonable" price.' 24 However, what ''reasonable terms"
means in this context is not clearly defined.

117. ld. at 7.
118. ld. at 8 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4)).
119. Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don't We Enforce Existing Drug Price
Controls? The Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed upon
Patents Deriving in Whole or in Part from Federally Funded Research, 75 TuL. L. REv. 631,
646 (2001).
120. Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 200 ("It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent
system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or
development ... [while] ensur[ing] that the Government obtains sufficient rights in federally
supported inventions to meet the needs of the Government and protect the public against
nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions.").

121.
122.
123.
124.

E.g., Arno & Davis, supra note 119, at 631.
See id. at 642-44.
35 U.S.C. § 201(1) (emphasis added).
See id.
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To be sure, courts have interpreted "reasonable terms" to include
reasonable prices in other contexts, 125 allowing some to argue that
"[t]erms may be considered unreasonable if the unit price is too
high" for purposes of§ 203(a)(1). 126 This may include, for example,
a unit price of sixty dollars per day. 127
However, the drafters of the Act, for whom it bears its name,
disagree:
Bayh-Dole did not intend that government set prices on resulting products. The law makes no reference to a reasonable price
that should be dictated by the government. This omission was
intentional; the primary purpose of the act was to entice the private sector to seek public-private research collaboration rather
than focusing on its own proprietary research. 128

Despite academic and activist pressure to interpret the Act to
include reasonable price controls, and some judicial precedent that
indicates the potential favorability of this interpretation, the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) has repeatedly refused to consider high drug prices across multiple applications for march-in
rights. 129

125. For example, courts routinely determine what constitutes reasonable royalties and
rates in the patent infringement context. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
126. Arno & Davis, supra note 119, at 651.
127. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
128. Birch Bayh & Robert Dole, Our Law Helps Patients Get New Drugs Sooner, WASH.

PosT (Apr. 11, 2002), https1/www.washingtonpost.com/archivelopinions/2002/04/1llour-law-

helps-patients-get-new-drugs-sooner/d814d.22a-6e63-4:fD6-8da.3-d9698552fa241 [https://perma.

ccf4MP9-94CT]; see also Joseph Allen, The Washington Post Misses the Mark on March-In
Rights, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 22, 2019), https:llwww.ipwatchdog.com/2019/04/22/washingtonpost-misses-mark-march-rightslid=108499/ [https1/perma.cc/HB5W-6EYN] (describing the
Arno and Davis interpretation of the Act as "post-enactment legislative history"); Christopher
Rowland, A Rare Deterrent to Limitless Drug Price Increases May Die Under Trump, WASH.

POST(Apr. 18, 2019), https:/lwww. washingtonpost.comlbusiness/economy/a-rare-deterrent-tolimitless-drug-price-increases-may-die-under-trump/2019/04/1717578e5e0-5bcd-11e9-a00e-

050dc7b82693_story.html [https1/perma.cc/4REA-DPME] (reporting on a Department of Com-

merce plan to "prohibit the government from suspending a drugmaker's exclusive patent over
excessive pricing'').

129. See generally Nat'! Insts. of Health, Opinion Letter in the Case of Norvir Manufactured by Abbott Laboratories, Inc_ (July 29, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 Opinion Letter],
https://www.ott.nih.gov/sitesldefault/fllesldocu.m.entslpolicy/March-In-Norvir.pdf

perma.cc/7THC-ESKV].

[h.ttps:/1
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B. March-In Petitions Have Failed Repeatedly
In the forty-year history of the Bayh-Dole Act, the government
has never utilized march-in rights. 180 NIH remains the only federal
agency to ever receive a petition to utilize its march-in authority. 131
In total, NIH has received six march-in petitions; all were denied.' 32
Two of those denials were for HIV medications and serve as convenient examples of why a march-in petition for PrEP will also result
in denial.

1. Ritonavir (2004)
In 2004, members of Congress requested that NIH exercise
march-in rights to expand access to the antiretroviral therapy
ritonavir133 under § 203(a)(l) of the Act.' 34 NIH expressly declined
to do so, determining that drug manufacturer Abbott Laboratories
had made the drug sufficiently available to the public. 135
In its denial, NIH responded to concerns related to drug pricing:
"the extraordinary remedy of march-in [rights] is not an appropriate
means of controlling prices."136 Citing market concerns, existing
licensing arrangements, and international implications of exercising
march-in rights in this context, NIH punted the issue, stating this
"is appropriately left for Congress to address legislatively." 137 NIH
"has the responsibility to exercise its march-in authority deliberately and with great care."188 But it ultimately appears that no
circumstance exists in which NIH, or any government agency, will
exercise this authority at all.

130.
131.
132.
133.
at 1.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

THOMAS, supra nnte 39, at 8.
ld.
ld.
Ritonavir is sold under the brand name Norvir. 2004 Opinion Letter, supra note 129,
ld.
ld. at 6.
ld. at 5-6.
ld. at 6.

Id.

2076

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2057

2. Ritonavir (2012)
When asked again in 2012 to exercise march-in rights for
ritonavir, NIH yet again declined."" Applicants specifically raised
the issue that prices for ritonavir were greatly disparate between
the United States and other countries. 140 NIH flatly rejected this
concern, stating: "We do not think that AbbVie pricing policies and
pricing disparities between the United States and other countries
trigger any of the four Bayh-Dole march-in criteria."141
Applicants further requested that NIH exercise march-in authority under§ 203(a)(2) in order to "alleviate health or safety needs
which are not reasonably satisfied" by the patent holder. 142 Here,
NIH again declined, citing the stable price ofthe drug in the United
States, as well as the Patient Assistance Program AbbVie offered. 143
NIH further declined to utilize paid-up license authority under 35
U.S.C. § 202(c)(4),44 citing the future ability of generics to come to
market under the Hatch-Waxman Act. 145 Taken collectively, the
government has resisted authorization of march-in rights to combat
high-drug prices and refused to utilize such rights in any other
context.

C. The Shortcomings of March-In Authority
The Bayh-Dole Act's march-in authority is an inefficient and inappropriate means to reduce PrEP prices and expand drug access
for patients. An infrequently discussed weakness of march-in rights
exists within the statutory scheme itself and stymies any potential
effort to expand patient access to PrEP. The statute plainly states
139. Nat'l lnsts. of Health, Opinion Letter on Determination in the Case of Norvir
Manufactured by AbbVie (Nov. 1, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 Opinion Letter], https://www.ott.
nih.govlsites/default/files/documents/policy/March-In-Norvir2013.pdf [https1/perma.cc/ZY4Q34YD].
140. ld. at 6.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 4-5.
143. ld. Gilead also maintains a patient-assistance program for PrEP. PrEP Assistance
Programs, NASTAD. https:/lwww.nastad.org/prepcost-resources/prep-assistance-program.s
[https://penna.cc/6BA2-HDGK].
144. See infra Part ILD.
145. 2013 Opinion Letter, supra note 139, at 6.
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that march-in applications predicated on § 203(a)(l) or § 203(a)(3)
"shall be held in abeyance pending the exhaustion of appeals or
petitions."146 This means that any exercise of march-in authority due
to high drug prices must be fully litigated before licensed use can
begin. Such litigation can take years, leaving drug prices unaffected
in the interim. Litigation as a means to reduce drug price disparity
is generally fraught, regardless. 147
NIH declined to grant a license in each of the six march-in
petitions it received. As such, no litigation, appeals, or adjudication
on the merits has occurred. How the Court of Federal Claims, which
has original jurisdiction on such matters, would rule is not guided
by any directly applicable precedent. If a federal agency were to
grant a march-in petition for the first time, litigation and appeal
would be certain to follow. As an issue of first impression, how a
court would rule on any march-in license is unpredictable. The culmination of unknowns is staggering.
Regardless, these shortcomings are mainly hypothetical as administrative agencies remain hesitant to exercise their statutory
authority in this way. NIH has repeatedly shown that price disparities are not a significant factor in its decisions to deny march-in
authority. 148 In 2004, the price ofritonavir increased by 400 percent
prior to the march-in application. 149 Yet, this price jump was not
sufficient for NIH to act. 150 In 2012, Abbott sold the same drug at
exorbitant prices in the United States as compared to markets
worldwide. 161 Again, NIH declined authorization. 162 The current
demand for march-in authorization for PrEP revolves around the
same facts: the drug is too expensive in the United States and is
priced discordantly worldwide. Any future march-in application is

146. 36 u.s.c. § 203(b).
147. See supra Part I.D.
148. See 2004 Opinion Letter, supra note 129, at 5-6.
149. Kevin E. Noonan, Groups Petition for NIH Exercise of March-In Rights over Abbott
Laboratories' Norvir, PATENT Docs (Oct. 31, 2012), https://www.patentdocs.org/2012/11/
groups-petition-for-nih-exercise-of-march-in-rights-over-abbott-laboratories-norvir.html
[https://perma.cc/T6DV-GX2Y].
150. See id.
151. ld.
152. Id.
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as likely to face denial as the six that came before it. 168 Administrative agencies instead turn to Congress, hoping for a legislative fix to
the broken march-in mechanism. Following the least productive
Congress in decades, it is unclear if hope for legislative action remains reasonable. 154

D. Paid-Up Licenses Are No Different
While march-in rights are unlikely to succeed at reducing the
price of PrEP, the Bayh-Dole Act includes a second government
licensure method. Section 202(c)(4) of the Act provides: "[T]he
Federal agency shall have a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have practiced for or on behalf
of the United States any subject invention throughout the world." 155
This means, for any invention made and patented under a federal
research grant, the government maintains a royalty-free license to
use that invention. 156
PrEP activists have called on the government to utilize this authority in addition to its march-in rights, as it does not suffer the
similar malady of abeyance pending litigation. 157 But just like the
march-in rights discussed above,§ 202(c)(4) has several drawbacks.
To begin, this paid-up license is only available to the federal government.158 No generic drug companies may attempt to utilize this
mechanism. 169 Instead, the government must utilize the patent itself

153. But see Nicholas Florko, 3 Reasons the Drug Industry Should Be Worried About
Biden's HHS Pick. Xavier Becerra, STAT NEWS (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/
2020/12/08J3.reasons·drug·industry.worry.becerra/[https://perma.cc/AH8X.JP73] (discussing
HHS Secretary Becerra's plans to use march-in rights to bring cheaper versions of COVID-19
treatments to market).
154. See, e.g., Rey Mashayekhi, The Current Congress Has Been the Least Productive in
Decades, A Warning Sign for Biden If the Senate Stays Red, FORTUNE (Dec. 10, 2020, 10:00
AM), https://fortune.com/2020/12/10/biden-divided.-congress-senate-georgia-run.off-mcconn.ellgop.republican·maiority/ [https:l/perma.cc/DLE9·CV4A].
155. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4).
156. See id.
157. PREP4ALL, supra note 33, at 38-39.
158. THOMAS, supra note 39, at 8.
159. Id.
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or authorize a specific manufacturer to produce the patented
product on the government's behalf. 160
However, given that government researchers, not a third-party
federal grant recipient, invented and patented PrEP, it is unclear
how a paid-up license applies in this context. A paid-up license
under this scenario would require the government to pay twice for
the same medication. 161 If the government asserts its rights to
Truvada for PrEP via CDC's patents, a paid-up license is still necessary for the underlying patent to emtricitabine. 162
Assuming a paid-up license was a potential avenue (and putting
aside any issues with the governmental origin of the PrEP patents),
concerns remain. Under this approach, the government maintains
responsibility to determine what constitutes a reasonable royalty for
use of PrEP-a similarly complicated analysis to the patent infringement damages analysis the District of Delaware is currently
being asked to calculate. 168
If the government took a tailored approach instead and sought
only to license or march-in on emtricitabine prior to its patent expiration, the calculation may be clearer, but litigation is unlikely to
reach a result before the '396 patent expires. If the government
sought to license Descovy and its component drugs prior to TAF's
patent expiration in 2032, the calculation of royalties is similarly
complex and would likely rely on the results of the ongoing '423
patent infringement litigation discussed in Part I. Collectively, the
exercise of march-in rights or paid-up licensure under the BayhDole Act is wrapped up in the same complications as patent infringement litigation and leaves patients waiting. In the face of
these barriers, another means of expanding access to PrEP while
reducing prices for patients remains available, one that Congress
has already "address[ed]legislatively"164-28 U.S.C. § 1498.
160. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4). This would not transfer the paid-up license to that specific

manufacturer. See id.
161. See Peter Arno & Michael Davis, Paying Twice for the Same Drugs, WASH. POST (Mar.

27, 2002), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2002/03127/paying-twice-for-thesame-drugs/c031aa41-caaf-450d-a95f-c072f69989311 [https://perma.cc/LK9E-QVYC].
162. The patent for tenofovir, at least in its TDF formulation utilized in Truvada for PrEP,
expired in 2017. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,922,695 (filed July 25, 1997) (issued July 13,
1999).
163. See supra notes 81-97 and accompanying text.
164. 2004 Opinion Letter, supra note 129, at 5-6.
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III. THE PATH FORWARD: 28 U.S. C.§ 1498

Legislators and activists have called for amendments to the
current patent law regime to expand access to PrEP and other lifesaving medications. In her 2020 bid for the Democratic nomination
for president, Senator Elizabeth Warren campaigned on a promise
to publicly manufacture PrEP through a new law that would allow
HHS to manufacture the drug following failure to reach certain
threshold accessibility requirements.'"" Then-Senator Kamala
Harris, in her bid for the presidential nomination, touted her own
bill that would require health insurance providers to cover PrEP. 166
Senator Bernie Sanders campaigned on his Medicare-for-All platform as well as legislation he introduced that would create a prize
model for HIV/AIDS medications, as opposed to the current patent
system. 167 But neither Warren'sAffordable Drug Manufacturing Act
nor Harris's PrEP Access and Coverage Act are necessary to achieve
these policy goals. A tool for expanding access to PrEP and allowing
for government or third-party manufacturing is already on the
books in the United States and is regularly utilized outside of the
pharmaceutical context.
A. Legislative History and Prior Use
28 U.S.C. § 1498 allows the United States government, or autho-

rized third parties, to manufacture and use any patented invention
so long as the inventor is paid "reasonable and entire compensation
for such use and manufacture."'"" While the Bayh-Dole Act only
165. Securing LGBTQ+ Rights and Equality, WARREN DEMOCRATS, https://elizabethwarren.
comlplansllgbtq-equality [https://perma.cc/9D34-IALN] ("[The] Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act [would] allow[] HHS to manufacture generic drugs when no company is manufacturing a drug, ... there is a shortage of the drug, or the drug is a WHO essential medicine.").
166. Hanna Trudo, How 2020 Democrats Would End the HIVEpidemic, DAILY BEAST (Sept.
9, 2019, 12:30 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-2020-democrats-would-end-the-hivepidemic [https://perma.cc/94M6-S3UW] ("[T]he PrEP Aecess and Coverage Act ... would require public and private health insurers to cover PrEP so that access to preventative medication is not determined by an individual's financial status.").
167. ld.
168. 28 U .S.C. § 1498(a) ("Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of
the United States is used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of the
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applies to inventions made with government funding, § 1498 can
apply to any and every patented invention. 169 Under§ 1498, govern·
ment use of the patent is immediate, the patent owner's only
remedy is to bring suit in the Court of Federal Claims, and the
patentee cannot seek injunctive relief.'70 There is no procedure to
activate this statutory provision; instead, rightsholders possess the
authority to recoup losses resulting from government use and infringement.171 Terminology for this statute section varies-commentators sometimes refer to § 1498 as "use without license" or simply
"government patent use"-but the effect is clear: the government
may use and infringe a valid patent, so long as it compensates the
owner.
While this conception frames the government use of patented
inventions as a limitation on the rights of a patent holder, the origin
of the statute is quite the opposite. 172 In response to a Supreme
Court case barring a patent infringement suit against the United
States under a theory of sovereign immunity, 173 Congress enacted
a statute allowing a patent owner to "recover reasonable compensation for [government] use" of their invention without license. 174 This
law served as the predecessor to § 1498 and, at the time, expanded
patent protection to provide a remedy against government use
where none had previously existed. 175 Although Congress considered
national security implications when the law was first enacted, such
scenarios did not become a reality until World War !. 176 During
owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner's remedy shall be by
action against the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery
of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and manufacture.").

169. ld.
170. Id.
171. See Richmond Screw Aochor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 344 (1928) (noting
that the statute effectuates "a waiver of immunity and effects an assumption of liability by
the Government'}.
172. See generally Christopher J. Morten & Charles Duan, Who'S Afraid of Section 1498?
A Case for Government Patent Use in Pandemics and Other National Crises, 23 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 1, 13-38 (2020).
173. Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 166-68 (1894).
174. Ao Act to Provide Additional Protection for Owners of Patents of the United States,
and for Other Purposes, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851 (1910); see also Morten & Duan, supra note 172,
at 13-14.
175. Morten & Duan, supra note 172, at 14-15.
176. Id. at 15.
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wartime, Congress amended the act to "expedite the manufacture
of war material" for the navy. 177 During World War II, Congress
amended the act again. 178 At a Senate committee hearing on the
proposed amendment, Senator Homer T. Bone summarized the legislation's goal:
No right fashioned by law is superior to the public welfare or
national interest. The very fact that men are to die to preserve
our system and way of life leaves only one conclusion; that is,
that patent rights and every other form of property right must
be subordinated to the all-out effort confronting us. It is crystal
clear that in this hour of trial the profit motive cannot be accented without inviting ... destruction. 179

Section 1498 took on new interest in the wake of the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001, and subsequent anthrax threats. 180
At the time, the only approved antibiotic to treat the biothreat was
ciprofloxacin, owned by German pharmaceutical giant Bayer AG .181
When Bayer was unable to meet government stockpile demands,
Senator Chuck Schumer called for generic manufacture of the antibiotic under§ 1498. 182 Schumer, Bayer, and HHS Secretary Tommy
Thompson waged a public fight on § 1498, and following threats to
amend that statute to remove any reasonable compensation
requirement, Bayer relented. 183 No branch of the government invoked the statute for the drug. 184 This rather public fight over
§ 1498 has had large implications for the statute's public image,
converting the "routine" and "commonplace" "government power''
into "an 'exceptional' remedy to be used only in a vanishingly small
177. Naval Service Appropriations Act, ch. 114, 40 Stat. 704, 705 (1918); see also Morten
& Duan, supra note 172. at 20.
178. Royalty Adjustment Aet, ch. 634, sec. 1, 56 Stat. 1013 (1942).
179. A Bill to Provide for the Use of Patents in the Interest of National Defense or the
Prosecution of the War, and for Other Purposes: Hearing on 8. 2303 Before the S. Comm. on
Patents, 77th Cong. 3 (1942) (statement of Homer T. Bone, Chairman, S. Comm. on Patents)
[hereinafter 1942 Hearing]; see also Morten & Duan, supra note 172, at 23-24.
180. Morten & Duan, supra note 172, at 26-33.
181. ld. at 26-27.
182. ld. at 28-29.
183. ld. at 30.
184. ld. at 30-31.
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set of circumstances." 186 In contrast, some academics argue that
§ 1498 should be "viewed as [an] ordinary and integral policy tool[]
with which the U.S. government can face emergencies of national
dimension, including public health crises.''186
B. Strengths of§ 1498

Section 1498's greatest utility is "in the context of a national
crisis."187 The continued rate of HIV infection in the United States
is such a crisis. In the United States alone, 1.2 million people are
living with the virus and 34,800 new infections occurred in 2019. 188
PrEP, the most effective drug available for preventing the spread of
the virus, is used only by 10 percent of adults at risk for contracting
HIV. 189 The most at-risk populations, including the homeless, transgender women, and those of low socioeconomic status, are those
with the least access to this life-altering, life-saving medication.•••
The exorbitant price ofPr EP is the largest barrier to its widespread
use.' 91 Despite the approval of Truvada for PrEP in 2012, rates of
new HIV infection in the United States have not meaningfully decreased.'92 The HIV/AIDS epidemic in the United States remains a
national crisis. In the words of Senator Bone: "[P] atent rights ...
must be subordinated to the ... effort confronting us.'' 193
However, if the scale of the crisis is somehow not large enough to
be of concern, those advocating for the expanded use of§ 1498 are
the first to concede that "government patent use does not need to be
reserved for extraordinary circumstances.'' 194 Section 1498 is a
flexible, customizable policy tool capable of achieving public health

185. Id. at 32.
186. Id. at 33. Morten & Duan then argue, in oonvincing detail, that§ 1498 should be readily used in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic to expand access to medications such as
remdesivir and vaccines. ld. at 69-90.
187. Id. at 12.
188. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 11.
189. Goldstein, supra note 26.
190. See id.
191. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
192. See U.S. DEF'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 11.
193. 1942 Hearing, supra note 179, at 3.
194. Morten & Duan, supra note 172, at 12.
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benefits regardless of the size of the problem. 195 Its first and most
important benefit is its speed of utilization. 196 Government invocation of§ 1498 rights is immediate, instantaneous, and without any
pomp or circumstance. 197 Patent holders cannot delay government
use or implementation of their inventions, nor can they seek an
injunction. 198 And, in stark contrast to march-in rights, there is no
requirement that government use ''be held in abeyance pending the
exhaustion of appeals or petitions." 199 Instead, rightsholders may
bring litigation to recoup costs only after the infringing use has
begun. 200 As such, patients will see an immediate benefit in terms
of drug accessibility and prescription pricing, benefits not present
in either patent infringement litigation or either arm of the BayhDole Act discussed above. While infringement litigation takes years
to recover damages and march-in rights may take just as long to
receive judicial approval, use rights under § 1498 offer immediate
and clear benefits.
The statute also allows for flexibility in government use. 201 While
historic examples concerned short-term drug shortages (such as
ciprofloxacin during the anthrax threats or Tamiflu during a flu
outbreak), the applicability of§ 1498 to PrEP is equally abundant.'02
The government can tailor the scope of PrEP usage to whatever extent necessary to achieve access goals. For example, the government
could provide PrEP on a short-term basis until more generics enter
the market, to only those covered by Medicare, or to qualified persons most in need. Section 1498's strength comes, in part, from the
flexibility of its possible usage.
Section 1498 is further strengthened by its ability to encourage
a negotiated remedy. News reports indicate that the current
195. Seeid. at 12-13.
196. ld. at 51-53.
197. Id. at 51 ('"[E]lection' or 'invocation' of government patent use are perhaps the wrong
terms to use-the U.S. government's power to use privately held patents is always on, by
default.").
198. See id.
199. See 35 U.S.C. § 203(b).
200. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) ("[T]heowner's [only] remedy shall be by action against the United
States in the United States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and
entire compensation for such use and manufacture.").
201. Morten & Duan, supra note 172, at 54-60.

202. See id. at 54.
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infringement litigation only began after failed licensing negotiations
between HHS and Gilead. 203 Section 1498 may overcome this
barrier. In 2001, following the threatened invocation of § 1498,
Bayer came back to the negotiating table, promising to manufacture
the necessary antibiotic en masse and at reduced prices. 204 As far
back as 1917, the threat of condemnation under§ 1498's precursor
was enough to bring the Wright brothers to the negotiating table to
aid in the war effort. 205 The threat of§ 1498, or its temporary utilization, may be the push necessary to restart negotiations between
Gilead and the government.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, § 1498 provides for an ex
post remedy determination. 206 While the rightsholder remains entitled to reasonable compensation for the government's infringing
use, an injured party must bring a claim to receive said compensation. 207 Although that judicial determination of reasonable compensation may be as complicated and fraught-especially in the case of
PrEP-as the infringement remuneration determinations discussed
in Part I.D above, that concern is offset by the delay in litigating
that calculation. 208 In the meantime, that delay of years provides the
government time to reasonably negotiate a license or settlement. 209
All the while, patient access to PrEP increases. Section 1498 proactively provides for increased drug access while prophylactically
addressing the potential harms of prolonged litigation: a cure
arrives before disease takes hold.
203. See Eric Sagonowsk:y, Unsuccessful in Licensing Talks, Feds Sue Gilead over PrEP-

Fbcused HN Patent, FIERCE PHARMA (Nov. 7, 2019, 10:57 AM), https://www.fiercepharma.

com/pharma/unsuccessful-licensing-talks-hhs-sues-gilead-for-prep-patent-infrin.gement
[https://penna.cc/5NAL-KGAP].
204. Keith Bradsher & Edmund L. Andrews, A Nation Challenged: Cipro; U.S. Says Bayer
Will Cut Cost oflteAnthraxDrug, N.Y. TiMES (Oct. 24, 2001), https:l/www.nytimes.com/20011
10/24/business/a-nation-challenged-cipro-us-says-bayer-will-cut-cost-of-its-anthrax-drug.html
[https://penna.cc/V8ZV-8MJW].
205. Morten & Duan, supra note 172, at 16-18.
206. ld. at 61-65.
207. ld. at 61.
208. Whereas patent infringement litigation requires a linear progression to the questions
of validity, infringement, and reasonable compensation before rewarding any monetary damages or changing drug accessibility, see supra Part I.D, § 1498 allows for the change to drug
accessibility to come before the damages calculation. See Morten & Duan, supra note 172, at
61-65. The ex post remedy calculation occurs after any government patent use. See id.
209. As demonstrated by Bayer in 2001, the mere threat of§ 1498 is enough to encourage
a settlement or reignite negotiations. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
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This feature pairs well with some of the unique facts concerning
PrEP, CDC's patents, and the ongoing infringement litigation. By
combining§ 1498 with an infringement suit, patients gain access to
treatment now, while the litigation and appeals process resolves
compensation issues in the background. 210 If the court finds Gilead
infringed CDC's patents, the government will owe a reduced rate of
reasonable compensation (if Gilead does not owe the government
damages for patent infringement in the first place). 211 What was a
weakness for both infringement litigation and march-in rights on
their own becomes a strength when combined with§ 1498. 212 Both
patients and the government enjoy benefits in the immediate and
long-term contexts.
In contrast, no plaintiff has litigated, and no court has ruled on,
march-in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act. 213 It will be an issue of
first impression and immediately appealed regardless of the outcome.214 And, as discussed, patients are left waiting for a final
decision before drug access becomes a reality. 215 Section 1498,
meanwhile, has been litigated in courts for over a century; the case
law is robust and clear. 216 Overall, the utility of§ 1498 extends beyond its applicability to public health crises, as it offers a range of
benefits to patients and patent holders that both infringement litigation and Bayh-Dole strategies lack.

210. This Note is not arguing that§ 1498 offers a speedy alternative to infringement litigation-in fact, its relative legal novelty is nearly certain to raise issues ripe for appeal. Cf.
ANSELL ET AL., supra note 93, at 14. However, by utilizing § 1498, the problems associated
with lengthy litigation are experienced after patients receive the benefit of increased drug
access.
211. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
212. Patent infringement litigation can take years to positively impact patients' lives. See
supra Part I.D. March-in rights, meanwhile, "shall be held in abeyance pending the exhaustion of appeals or petitions." 35 U.S.C. § 203(b); see also supra Part II. C. Instead,§ 1498places
patient impact first. Legal challenges remain available but cannot be used as roadblocks.

213.
214.
215.
216.

See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II. C-D.
See supra Parts I.D, II. C-D.
See, e.g., Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 345 (1928) C'We
must presume that Congress in the passage of[§ 1498] intended to secure to the owner of the
patent the exact equivalent of what it was taking away from him.'').
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C. Potential Drawbacks of§ 1498
It would be na'ive to claim that the use of§ 1498 comes without
any reasonable concern. It is the core tenant of patent law that
patents are necessary to incentivize invention and innovation. 217
The patent strikes a bargain between the inventor and the public:
in exchange for a limited period of monopoly, the public learns how
to use an invention. In some ways, a patent allows the patentee to
build a "security fence" around a novel idea, protecting the value
and profitability of the invention. 218 It follows that this incentivized
monopoly and inherent protection are what enable research and
development investments, especially in the pharmaceutical space. 219
The patent system protects more than the discovered invention; it
protects the investment. 220 What happens when that protection
weakens? While legal and economic scholars have debated the
veracity of this core tenet, 221 the application to § 1498 in the pharmaceutical context requires a closer examination.
In the case of PrEP, private industry innovation did not lead to its
discovery. 222 Instead, a public health crisis, government funds, and
government labor created a miracle of medicine. 223 In the years that
followed, private companies have profited off that innovation, without the initial research and development investment that the patent
system supposedly incentivizes.
Putting aside the question of who invented PrEP,§ 1498 nonetheless ensures profitability. The patentee retains the right to "reasonable and entire compensation." 224 Although government use and the
217. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing for patents "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts"). See generally Mark Eccleston-Turner, The Economic Theory of
Patent Protection and Pandemic Influenza Vaccines: Do Patents ReaUy Incentivize Innovation
in the Fi£ld?, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 572 (2016).
218. AnAMB.JAFFE&JOSHLERNER,lNNOVATIONANDITSDISCONTENTS:HOWOURBROKEN
PATENT SYSTEM Is ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 43

(2004).
219. ld. at 42-43.
220. Id. at 43.
221. See, e.g., David Kline, Do Patents Truly Promote Innovation?, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 15,
2014), https:/lwww.ipwatchdog.com/2014104115/do-pstents-truly-promote-innovation/id=487681
[https://perma.cci7PN4-T62T].
222. See supra Part I.
223. See supra Part LA-B.
224. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).
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resulting litigation delay compensation by a number of years, that
investment will still see a just return. If this delay in compensation
puts the rightsholder in a dire situation, the patentee can negotiate
a license instead. 225 In the interim, short- and long-term public
health interests and the need for life-saving medication counterbalance a patent holder's short-term profit interests. Further, the government has established other incentive regimes besides patents.
Inventors can innovate and recoup research and development costs
under grants, prizes, and patent buyouts with similar success. 226
PrEP is not the only drug that addresses an ongoing health crisis.
Section 1498 has only grown in popularity as a potential avenue for
expanded drug access and reduced drug cost in the wake of the
COVID-19 pandemic. 227 Academics, doctors, patients, and politicians
have all called for government use of current and future vaccines. 228
The development of a COVID-19 vaccine within one year of sequencing the virus demonstrates what sufficient research and development investment can achieve. But this argument highlights the
misplaced concerns about incentives. When faced with a global pandemic, profit is no longer the sole driver of innovation. Regardless,
the statutory scheme of§ 1498 ensures inventors receive compensation (albeit eventually) for their innovations.
Concerns regarding government overreach extend beyond the
application of§ 1498 to other drug products. Some critics argue that
government patent use under§ 1498 constitutes a taking under the
Fifth Amendment, likening government patent use to eminent
domain."29 Under this argument, government use under§ 1498 constitutes a taking of "private property ... for public use," which in
turn requires "just compensation."230 Courts have grappled with
this question, concluding that § 1498 does not implicate the Fifth
Amendment. 231 Unlike "taking" or condemning real property, courts
equate the "taking" of a patent with the effective "creation" of a
225. See supra Part III.B.
226. Morten & Duan, supra note 172, at 39-43.
227. See generally id.

228. ld. at 69-70.
229. See generally Joshua I. Miller, 28 U.S. C. § 1498(a) and the Unconstitutional Taking
of Patents, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2010).
230. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

231. Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
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license.' 82 As part of that license, Congress created a cause of action
for patentees to recover losses.' 33 The government's ability to use a
patent under § 1498 does not constitute a seizure, a taking, or a
revocation of patent rights; if anything, § 1498 states a promise to
compensate for infringing use by the government._'••
Other critics, including some government actors, point to the need
for Congress to address drug prices directly. 285 When NIH rejected
march-in rights as an avenue for drug-price control, the agency
called on "Congress to address [this issue]legislatively." 236 By pass·
ing, and then repeatedly amending § 1498, Congress has done so.
Congress's other attempt to address drug pricing, namely the Bayh·
Dole Act, created a statutory mechanism that remains hypothetical
in application. Instead, Congress enacted the legal mechanisms for
government patent use, and subsequently drug price control, over
a century ago.'37
It is unlikely that § 1498 will actually stifle innovation, cause a
wave of government overreach, or further exacerbate legislative
inactivity. The statutory design of§ 1498, particularly the ability of
rightsholders to recover damages, proactively mitigates these concerns.
CONCLUSION

The United States must address its continued HIV/AIDS epidemic. Ongoing disputes over patent rights are ripe for appeal,
prolonging the epidemic and offering no clear benefit to patients.
March-in rights or paid-up licenses offer a potential remedy but
have repeatedly failed to achieve price control. If the government
utilizes march-in rights for the first time in history, litigation delays
lurk around the corner and again leave patients waiting. Instead,
28 U.S.C. § 1498 provides the strongest legal way to confront this
crisis. The existing law offers fast, flexible, and fine-tuned actions
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1352 ("Congress provided a specific sovereign immunity waiver for a patentee
to recover for infringement by the government.").
234. See Morten & Duan, supra note 172, at 14.
235. See supra Part II.B.l.
236. 2004 Opinion Letter, supra note 129, at 5-6.

237. See supra Part liLA.
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to address patients' needs while preserving rightsholders' interests.
When combined with the other approaches, § 1498's strength only
increases. Section 1498 offers the patent prophylaxis HIV/AIDS
patients and at-risk individuals need to expand access to this lifesaving medication.
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